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The initial step in the development of the common law occurred when Wil-
liam the Conqueror became the King of England and agreed that his reign
would be subject to existing unwritten customary law. The next significant event
occurred when Henry II elected to unify the country under a system of courts
rather than a text of words. The end result was an effort to achieve justice
through the means of an unwritten law, binding on all, including the King, and
proclaimed by judges engaged in resolving controversies in actual cases. As the
beneficiaries of the English tradition, American jurists and lawyers have de-
voted considerable time and effort in debating whether judges make law or
merely declare law. Rather than join in that jurisprudential debate, this writing
will focus on one particular situation in which a court is unquestionably en-
gaged in making law and attempt to assess the performance of that function.
The State of Maine recently expanded the basis for direct appeal in crimi-
nal cases to include an appeal of the sentence. In a somewhat unusual develop-
ment, the Supreme Judicial Court has been charged expressly with the task of
making law. In effect, the court has been transported back in time to the begin-
ning of the common law tradition and faces the task of reaching decisions in
particular cases on the basis of little more than notions of justice, common
sense, rationality, custom, and prevailing practice. It is not often that the trap-
pings and language of the law are stripped away so completely. An analysis of
the lawmaking function as openly practiced under earlier, more primitive condi-
tions might reveal something about the thoughts and behavior of modern law-
yers and judges. Moreover, such an analysis might shed light on the judicial
function of lawmaking as practiced in its more advanced and elegant form.
Until 1965, Maine had no sentencing law other than the broad categories
of sentences authorized by the Legislature. In that year, the Maine Legislature
created the Appellate Division of the Maine Supreme Judicial Court and as-
signed a three-member panel the task of reviewing sentences to the state
prison.1 Because the division was perceived as a tribunal for correcting the most
egregious cases of sentence disparity, and not as a lawmaking body, its work
was hampered. In twenty-four years of operation, it changed only twenty
sentences and produced one useful opinion that included a workable set of crite-
* Justice, Maine Supreme Judicial Court.
I. Pub. L. 1965. oh. 419. § 1. codified at ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2141-42 (1980). repealed by Pub. L.
1989. ch. 218 (effective Sept. 30, 1989).
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ria for distinguishing life sentences from sentences for a term of years. Accord-
ingly, sentencing in Maine remained largely a matter of discretion for the sen-
tencing judge, subject only to the minimum and maximum length of sentence
established by statute. Although direct appeal of a criminal sentence was possi-
ble in theory, the inquiry on appeal was confined to a determination of whether
the sentence was legal, i.e., within the statutory maximum. It is not an exagger-
ation to state that in Maine, as in many other states, the authority of the sen-
tencing judge was unconfined by law. Sentencing customs and norms, though
unenforceable, were sometimes recognized and honored by judges; nevertheless,
a comprehensive law of sentencing did not exist.
Gradually, over the years, the need to structure and govern the sentencing
judge's discretion became apparent. Maine confronted an increase in serious
crime, enhanced advocacy for victims, lengthier sentences, overcrowded prisons,
and claims of disparate sentencing. Although the problems were common with
many other jurisdictions, in 1989 Maine pursued a distinctive solution by elect-
ing to expand the grounds for direct appeal of sentences. Maine rejected legisla-
tive sentencing guidelines and charged the judiciary with the task of creating a
law of sentencing as a product of the appellate process.2 Thus, in a microcosm,
we have replicated the conditions that spawned the common law: a small group
of judges fashioning law on a case-by-case basis from unwritten custom and
practice.
A brief description of the resulting appeal process will suffice. Under the
new statute, Maine provides a method of discretionary review modeled on the
English system 3 and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice." A person sen-
tenced to a term of more than one year is entitled to apply for leave to appeal
that sentence to the Supreme Judicial Court. The application is screened by a
panel of three justices and the application is granted if any one of the justices
votes in the affirmative. After screening, the sentence appeal is heard before the
full court in the usual manner with briefing, oral argument, and a published
opinion. The appellate court is authorized to change the sentence to any disposi-
tion that was open to the sentencing court, but the new sentence cannot be more
severe than the original. The purposes of the review process are broadly stated
and include correcting sentences excessive in length, correcting abuses of the
sentencing power, reducing sentencing inequality, and promoting the develop-
ment and application of rational sentencing criteria. The court is authorized to
consider not only the propriety of the sentence but also the manner in which it
2. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. § 2151-57 (Supp. 1990). This legislation is based on a statute proposed by
this author in a law review article. Wathen, Disparity and the Need for Sentencing Guidelines in Maine: A
Proposal for Enhanced Appellate Review. 40 ME. L. REV. I, 38-40 (1988). The procedure for sentence appeal is
now set forth in ME. R. CRINI. P. 40. 40A, 40B. and 40C (adopted effective October 2. 1989). The United States
Sentencing Commission Guidelines, 52 Fed. Reg. 18,046 (1987). provide an example of a method of creating
guidelines through the legislative and administrative process.
3. For a description of the English procedure for appellate review of sentences, see Wathen. supra note 2, at
19-34; D.A. TIIOMAS. PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING 365-401 (2d ed. 1979). Meador. English Appellate Judges
front an American Perspective, 66 GEO. L.J. 1349 (1978). Thomas, Appellate Review of Sentences and the Devel-
opment of Sentencing Policy: The English Experience. 20 ALA. L. REV. 193 (1968).
4. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, Standards 20-1.1 to -3.3 (2d ed. 1980 & Supp. 1982).
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was imposed and the information on which it was based. It is difficult to imag-
ine a broader charter or a more sweeping mandate for lawmaking.
In the first year of operation approximately 150 defendants have filed ap-
plications for leave to appeal from their sentences. The panel has considered
ninety-two of those applications, granting twelve and denying the remainder.
The Supreme Judicial Court has rendered an opinion in four of the cases and
eight remain in the pipeline. It is far too early to determine whether the pur-
poses set forth by the Legislature are being achieved, but it may be an oppor-
tune time to review carefully the work product, as well as the performance of
lawyers and judges when actually faced with the task of making law. Any short-
comings or defects detected under this microscopic view may be part of a larger
infectious process at work in the body of the law.
Because no statement of reason is included in the application for sentence
appeal or the order granting it, neither the screening judges nor the defense
lawyer knows what the other party had in mind. Accordingly, the analysis of
the four cases decided thus far will focus solely on the following three levels: the
issue that prompted the granting of the application, 5 the arguments addressed
by counsel, and the decision of the court.
I. STATE V. HALLOWELL
6
The defendant, a felon, was convicted of unlawfully possessing a firearm7
and criminal threatening with a dangerous weapon.8 Both offenses carry a max-
imum sentence of five years' imprisonment. The nature of the offenses commit-
ted may be summarized as follows: The defendant walked into the manager's
room in a boarding house in which he lived. He was intoxicated, and the man-
ager testified that there had been some rent problems. After a brief verbal ex-
change, the defendant pulled a revolver from his rear pocket and pointed it at
the manager. The manager told the defendant to put the gun away or use it,
whereupon the defendant cocked the hammer and spun the cylinder revealing
live ammunition. He prevented the manager from using the phone to call the
police, but the manager was able to leave the building without injury. The de-
fendant subsequently left, stopped in a parking lot, and fired two shots into a
snow bank before going next door to a neighboring apartment where he was
eventually apprehended by the police.
The defendant's circumstances offer little basis for mitigation. He is a
thirty-seven-year-old unemployed carpenter and high school dropout. Twice
married and twice divorced, he has one child whom he consented to give up to
adoption. He has had substance abuse problems since he was sixteen and suffers
from alcoholism. Although he served in Vietnam and claims to suffer from post-
5. The three-person panel does not record its reasons for granting or denying leave to appeal. The grounds
stated herein arc those of the author who is one of the three members of the panel.
6. 577 A.2d 778 (Me. 1990).
7. Mt. Ri-v. STAT. ANN. tit. 15. § 393 (1980 & Supp. 1989).
8. Mik. Rt-v, STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A. § 209 (1983). The Class D offense of criminal threatening is enhanced to
a Class C offense if committed "'with the use of a dangerous weapon." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A. § 1252(4)
(1983).
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traumatic stress disorder, he has never been evaluated or treated. He has an
extensive criminal record, including felony convictions of arson, gross sexual
misconduct, unlawful sexual contact, aggravated assault, and multiple misde-
meanor convictions. The report of the probation office states that "he has a long
history of alcoholism and assaultive behavior."9 He has been unable to hold a
job because of his alcoholism and has served a three-year sentence in Florida
prisons and a total of four years in the Maine State Prison. The sentencing
judge imposed a sentence of five years on the charge of criminal threatening,
suspending all but four years, and ordered four years of probation to commence
at the completion of the unsuspended term. A concurrent four-year sentence
was imposed on the charge of unlawful possession of a firearm.
The issue that prompted the granting of the application was the need to
establish a standard of review and to determine the relationship between the
nature of the offenses and the circumstances of the offender. In other words,
should the maximum sentence be determined by what the defendant did or
should it be influenced as well by a consideration of who he is? The defense
counsel submitted a brief in which he argued that the safety of the public could
best be protected from a repeat offender whose criminal history stems from
long-term alcoholism by shorter sentences with a longer period of probation. He
argued that two substantial terms of incarceration failed to induce the defend-
ant to conquer his alcoholism and it was time to try a different incentive.
In response, the State pointed out that the sentencing judge had appropri-
ately recited all of the sentencing factors specified by the Legislature. The State
further observed that the sentence was not a maximum sentence nor was it "il-
legal." Finally, the State assured the appellate court that the record revealed
that the sentence was not imposed lightly or with little thought, but, in fact,
resulted from a conscious and deliberate evaluation conducted by the sentencing
judge. Neither the brief of the defendant nor the State contains any citation of
authority other than a passing reference to the statute authorizing sentence
review.
In its opinion, the appellate court first directed its attention to the standard
of review and stated:
The standard for our review may be described as an examination of sentences for
misapplication of principle. It is not enough that the members of this court might have
passed a different sentence, rather it is only when a sentence appears to err in principle
that we will alter it.10
Next, the court observed that all criminal conduct is not the same and that the
maximum sentence in any given case should be determined in the first instance
by a consideration of the nature and seriousness of the offense rather than the
circumstances of the offender. The court then identified four aspects of the de-
fendant's criminal conduct which, taken together, justified sentences in the up-
per twenty-five percent of the sentencing range provided by the Legislature: the
display of a loaded firearm in a threatening manner without provocation, the
9. Hallowell 577 A.2d at 786.
10. Id. at 788.
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discharge of a firearm, the invasion of the victim's home, and the commission of
the offenses while in a drunken condition. The court dispensed with defense
counsel's argument about incentives by observing that "the degree of mitigation
called for by the circumstances of the offender is, in the first instance, a matter
for the sentencing judge.""1 The court concluded that the sentencing judge was
free to reject the defense's suggested strategy for rehabilitating a chronic
alcoholic.
II. STATE V. SHORTSLEEVES"2
The defendant was convicted of murder 3 which carries a minimum sen-
tence of twenty-five years and a maximum sentence of life in prison. Because
Maine has no parole, a person sentenced to life is never eligible for release. A
sentence to a term of years, however, results in release at the end of the term
minus a deduction of approximately one-third for good behavior. In the case
under consideration, the defendant and a companion killed an elderly woman
and stole money from her house. During a drinking bout, these two drove by the
victim's house. The companion indicated that he wanted to kill the woman, and
at some point in the evening they stopped and gained entry by pretending that
the defendant had been injured. Once in the house, the companion began to
beat the elderly woman, eventually with a billy club and a frying pan provided
by the defendant. Both kicked the woman while she was lying on the floor. The
defendant searched the house for money and took what was available. In order
to ensure that the woman was dead, they found a knife and the companion slit
her throat and stabbed her at least nine times in the neck. The jury was in-
structed on both accomplice and principal liability and returned a general ver-
dict finding the defendant guilty of murder.
The defendant was twenty-one at the time of the killing and had prior
adult and juvenile records including convictions for assault, robbery, burglary,
theft, and criminal trespass. Released from prison three months before the kill-
ing, the defendant was on probation at the time of the offense. Psychological
evaluation at the time of sentencing showed that the defendant had a "severe
anti-social personality disorder" and suggested a poor prognosis for treatment.
An earlier evaluation concluded that the defendant has a "well-entrenched soci-
opathic disorder." The sentencing justice, finding that the murder was premedi-
tated and accompanied by extreme cruelty, imposed a sentence of life in prison.
The application for review was granted in order to consider the adoption of
the existing criteria for the imposition of a life sentence and to determine the
applicability of the criteria to an accomplice. The defense counsel ignored any
possible difference in the application of the criteria to an accomplice, arguing
that this case was dissimilar to those cases in which premeditation and extreme
cruelty had been found and similar to another case in which the appellate divi-
sion vacated a life sentence because extreme cruelty was not present.
11I. Id. at 789-90.
12. 580 A.2d 145 (Me. 1990).
13. hit Ri-v. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A. § 201(I)(A) (1983).
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In its opinion, the court adopted the existing criteria and found that two of
the criteria for imposing a life sentence were present, namely premeditation and
murder accompanied by extreme cruelty. The court first separated the acts of
the defendant from those of his companion and required that there be evidence
that the defendant acted with premeditation and extreme cruelty in order to
justify a life sentence. The court concluded that there was adequate evidence of
premeditation on the part of the defendant that the murder was committed with
extreme cruelty, and that the defendant knowingly aided in the infliction of
such cruelty.
III. STATE V. TELLIER1
4
The defendant was convicted on a plea of guilty to charges of kidnapping, 15
unlawful sexual contact,' 6 and aggravated assault.'1 The maximum sentences
authorized are twenty years, five years, and ten years, respectively. In return for
his guilty plea, charges of assault and attempted murder arising out of the same
incident were dismissed. The facts concerning the offenses are as follows: In the
late afternoon, the defendant forced his neighbor's ten-year-old daughter into
his car under the pretext of needing her help in selecting flowers for his wife's
birthday. He drove twenty-one miles and parked his car off a deserted dead-end
road. After threatening the child with physical harm if she did not engage in
certain sexual acts, he removed her clothes, had sexual contact with her, and
forced her to have sexual contact with him. He then asked her not to tell any-
one what had happened. When she refused, he beat and choked her until she
became unconscious and then left her on the ground. She woke up in the middle
of the night, cold and frightened, then fell back asleep. When she awoke again
at dawn, she managed to find her way back to the main road and summon help.
Photographs taken at the time show extensive bruises, lacerations, and apparent
burns to her face, arms, and neck.
The circumstances of the defendant are not reflected in the record other
than the fact that he had previously been convicted of a charge of Class B theft
and was sentenced to three years in prison with all but one year suspended. The
unsuspended year was served under intensive supervision rather than in prison.
The defendant was still on probation when he committed the subject offense.
The sentencing justice did not order a presentence investigation and report, and
no inquiry was made at the sentencing concerning the circumstances of the de-
fendant. There was no psychological evaluation. The justice imposed the
sentences agreed upon by the prosecution and the defense: maximum sentences
of twenty years for kidnapping, five years for unlawful sexual contact, and ten
years for aggravated assault with all but four years suspended and six years
probation. The court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively.
14. 580 A.2d 1333 (Me. 1990).
15. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 301 (1983).
16. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A. § 255 (1983 & Supp. 1989).
17. ME, REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 208 (1983).
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The issues that prompted the granting of the application were the legality
of the consecutive sentences, the sufficiency of the information on which the
sentences were based, and the effect of the plea bargain upon the review of what
might otherwise be considered as excessive sentences. The defense brief argued
correctly that consecutive sentences for kidnapping and sexual contact were pro-
hibited by statute. Maine law prohibits consecutive terms for crimes arising out
of the same criminal episode when one crime consists only of a form of prepara-
tion to commit, or facilitation of the other. With regard to the length of the
sentences in general, the defense counsel argued that the defendant's lack of a
serious prior record and his age made him a good candidate for rehabilitation.
He also argued that the remarks of the sentencing justice revealed that he was
improperly influenced by a legislative amendment, subsequent to this case, in-
creasing to forty years the authorized sentence for kidnapping. The State sought
merely to defend the factual basis for consecutive sentences and argued that the
kidnapping was not meant to facilitate the sexual contact.
The court ruled that the consecutive sentences for kidnapping and unlawful
sexual contact were prohibited by statute. The court declined to impose substi-
tute sentences because of the total absence of any information concerning the
defendant's circumstances in the record. Noting the absence of a presentence
investigation, the court emphasized the desirability of such a procedure when-
ever significant incarceration is a possibility, but stopped short of requiring it.
The court ruled that sentences were not insulated from review because they
resulted from a plea bargain and the agreement of the parties. The court ruled
that "[t]here are greater public interests at stake in sentencing than those of the
prosecutor and the defendant. All sentences, even those agreed upon by the par-
ties, are subject to appellate review and must be demonstrably appropriate to
the circumstances of the case."' 8
IV. STATE V. ST. PIERRE'"
The defendant was convicted of murder 20 and faced a sentence range of
twenty-five years to life. On the date in question, the defendant claimed to have
smoked marijuana, consumed twelve to fifteen drinks, and consumed other
drugs, including three grams of cocaine and psychedelic mushrooms. During the
evening, he met the victim, a young, deaf mute woman, in a bar and she volun-
tarily accompanied him to his room at the end of the evening. In his testimony
before the court, the defendant explained that while they were engaging in oral
sex, the victim bit his penis and punched him. He reacted angrily and struck
her many times in the head with a jackhammer bit and then strangled her. He
then carried her from his room to a river nearby and dumped her in the river.
The evidence is inconclusive as to whether the victim was still alive when he
threw her in the river.
18. Tellier. 580 A.2d at 1343.
19. 584 A.2d 618 (Me. 1990).
20. ME REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A. § 201(I)(A) (1983).
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The defendant, twenty-years old at the time of the offense, is a high school
dropout with a non-violent misdemeanor record. He lived in a single room above
a restaurant and bar where he worked occasionally as a disc jockey and
bouncer. He supplemented his income by selling small amounts of cocaine and
marijuana. The presentence report, prepared by the Department of Probation
and Parole, likened the defendant to a serial killer and recommended a life
sentence, stating that "in light of the predatory nature of the defendant choos-
ing his victim, the violence and brutality of the killing, and the concern for the
protection of the public from this type of defendant, it is recommended that the
sentence in this case be commitment to the Department of Corrections for the
remainder of the defendant's natural life." Nothing in the report supports the
conclusion that the defendant is a serial killer. The prosecuting attorney recom-
mended a fifty-year sentence at the time of sentencing. The sentencing justice,
without referring to the presentence report, imposed a sentence of life on the
basis that the killing was accompanied by extreme cruelty and sexual abuse.
The application was granted in order to determine whether the criteria for
a life sentence had been satisfied. The brief for the defense argued that the facts
of the case were similar to the facts in State v. Haberski,21 and less egregious
than the facts in other cases involving a life sentence. In attempting to justify
the life sentence, the State drew an analogy between the requirement of ex-
treme cruelty and similar formulas used in other jurisdictions to distinguish be-
tween a life sentence and a sentence of death by execution. Relying on the
analogous authority, the State argued that extreme cruelty could be found ei-
ther from the nature of the killing, the effect on the victim, or the attitude of
the killer. Focusing upon the number of blows and the possibility that the victim
was still alive when dragged to the river and thrown in, the State argued that
the sentencing justice was justified in making a finding of extreme cruelty.
In its opinion, the court vacated the life sentence and imposed a sentence of
forty-five years. The court held that the defendant's conduct did not "evidence
the extremely vicious quality that would constitute extreme cruelty." 2 The
court attempted further definition as follows:
Imposition of a life sentence on the basis of extreme cruelty alone will require a show-
ing that the viciousness of the murder differed in a substantial degree from that which
inheres in the crime of murder. As the Appellate Division stated in State v. Haberski,
No. AD-85-54 (Me. App. Div. February 6, 1987), "if acts of murderous cruelty could
be arranged on a continuum, the phrase 'extreme cruelty' would delineate the outer-
most portion of the range."
' .* the savagery of this killing is unquestioned, but the evidence clearly points to
the fact that St. Pierre's acts, unlike those in other cases where our courts have im-
posed life sentences, did not involve torture or other gratuitous suffering inflicted on
the victim. 22
21. No. AD-85-54 (Me. App. Div. Feb. 6. 1987) (Defendant dragged his wife into the woods, repeatedly
hitting her with a gun which discharged on several occasions, and killed her. Her body had approximately thirty
injuries: she had been shot three times. The Appellate Division, finding that this crime did not evidence extreme
cruelty, replaced the Superior Court's imposed life sentence with a sentence of fifty years.) (As discussed it) St.
Pierre. 584 A.2d at 618.
22. St. Pierre. 584, A.2d at 621.
23. Id. at 621-22.
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The court also intimated that the defendant might be entitled to mitigation be-
cause of his youth, lack of a serious criminal record, prospects for rehabilitation,
and the absence of a significant threat to the public. The court resentenced the
defendant to a term of forty-five years and explained the sentence in the follow-
ing terms:
In Haberski the Appellate Division described the pattern of sentencing for murder
during the first eleven years under the Criminal Code, concluding that the average of
sixty-six sentences was approximately 34 years. Haberski, No. AD-85-54 at p. 5 n.3.
Giving consideration to all of these factors, we conclude that a term of forty-five years
is an appropriate sentence, warranted by the seriousness of the offense, but more in
line with other sentences.2 '
Before turning to an analysis of the cases decided thus far, it should be
observed initially that the number of applications for leave to appeal under the
new procedure remains quite small. The former system involved a disincentive
for appeal-sentences were subject to increase as well as reduction, and in fact
some were increased. In a typical year, eighty defendants would appeal their
sentence under the old system. Despite the fact that appeal from sentence now
involves no risk of an increased sentence and the further fact that the sentenc-
ing judge is required to advise each defendant about the right to seek sentence
review, the number of appeals rose only to 150. It is reasonable to estimate the
total number of defendants eligible for sentence review as exceeding 1500. It is
difficult to explain the small number of appeals on the basis of a slow reaction
to change on the part of the bar and criminal defendants. Maine has had a form
of sentence review available for twenty-four years, and that should be sufficient
time to accommodate adaptive delay.
The small number of appeals may result from a belief, deeply ingrained in
the mind of the local legal culture, that sentencing involves a virtually unre-
viewable act of discretion and that relief on appeal could only result from an act
of grace. Even though the law commonly regulates and structures the exercise
of discretion, sentencing discretion is treated differently. There may be good
reason for some difference in treatment. Sentencing is an intensely personal task
for all participants, and the sentencing decision is as complex as the person
sentenced. In this one area, the law attempts to judge people individually rather
than as part of a group. Great freedom is given the judge to assess who the
defendant is and what he did. When properly conducted, the sentence hearing
involves emotion as well as reason and it produces a gestalt. The actual basis for
a sentencing decision is not easily described (in most cases the attempt is unsuc-
cessful), nor is it easily analyzed. Lawyers may hesitate to challenge sentencing
decisions because the usual language and method of the law inadequately ad-
dress the problems presented in criminal sentencing.
Despite Justice Holmes' observation that the life of the law has been expe-
rience rather than logic, it is usually referred to as a rational process and de-
scribed in rational terms. Moreover, the law usually gives the appearance of
being rational, if for no other reason than the fact that it represents the latest
24. Id.
1991]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
development in an ongoing process of legal analysis and criticism. In its embry-
onic state, however, the law has no analytical labels. Under such circumstances,
the rationality of the law is judged solely from its expression and its result, as
measured against external standards. It is possible that judges and lawyers
might shrink from such a task. The question, simply put, is whether the law is
capable of addressing society's need for achieving a degree of justice and parity
in sentencing while maintaining some semblance of balance between the num-
ber of prison beds and the number of prisoners. If not, why not?25
It is apparent that judges and lawyers are not completely comfortable in
relying on custom as a source of law. Custom has always been unwieldy. It is
usually expressed as an impression gleaned from collective experience rather
than an empirical fact. Obviously, the validity and persuasive force of an ex-
pression of custom depends entirely on the credentials and experience of the
person or body making the statement. Although such an expression is difficult to
prove or disprove, it is easily and effectively challenged by any instance of
deviation. It is noteworthy that in the four cases under study, no lawyer has
sought to argue on the basis of sentencing custom. Is the impression of an ex-
perienced and able trial lawyer of no value? As appellate judges are further and
further removed from trial practice, judges may have little confidence that they
are familiar with sentencing custom. In St. Pierre, the court relied on custom,
but did so without openly acknowledging the fact. In resentencing the defendant
to a term of forty-five years, the court is really reflecting its perception of the
customary sentence for this type of a homicide. Although the court decision
recites some supporting statistics, the actual basis for the sentence is a judg-
ment call concerning the length of a customary sentence. Should such a basis be
frankly stated, discussed, and criticized, or should it be obscured in the interest
of preserving the perception of rationality?
None of the advocacy thus far involves any attempt to analyze the struc-
ture and purpose of sentence review. It would seem that the legal analysis of the
propriety of any sentence should rest upon a greater goal than a favorable result
in that one case. Some general features of a sentencing scheme should be identi-
fied and agreed upon. Certainly, there are areas of confusion and many un-
resolved points, but there must be points of agreement. It is certain that strict
uniformity in sentencing is not the goal because that could easily be achieved by
providing one sentence for each offense. The legislature recognizes that a vari-
ety of criminal conduct is included within one generic offense and that offenders
differ greatly in terms of culpability and risk to society. The unquestioned goal
is to sentence similar types of offenders who commit similar offenses to roughly
similar sentences. It therefore becomes necessary to loosely categorize offenses
and offenders and establish some functional relationship among the three com-
ponents of the sentence: the nature of the offense, the nature of the offender,
and the need to protect the public.
25. Many of the problems observed in creating a law of sentencing were anticipated and made the basis of a
writing assignment in a legal textbook. J. WHITE. THE LEGAL IMAGINATION 363 (1973).
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At least until the decision in Tellier, it was possible to impose the maxi-
mum sentence and rely solely on either a heinous offense, a culpable defendant,
or great risk to the public. The law tends to avoid categorical conclusions and it
may be desirable generally to keep options open for future cases. When dealing
with such fundamental questions, however, certainty is essential. If any one of
the three components of the sentence can serve as the basis for determining the
maximum sentence, then the task of comparing sentences is indeed complex. A
three-point comparison of sentences is significantly more difficult than compari-
son with reference to a single component. Accordingly, the determination of the
relationship among the three components of a sentence is crucial. A number of
possible arrangements exist. The nature of the offense could determine the max-
imum sentence and the circumstances of the offender could be considered only
in terms of mitigation. This is the approach suggested in Hallowell. It is possi-
ble, however, that the offender's circumstances could also be considered as an
aggravating factor. The more difficult question, however, is how to factor in the
need to protect the public. Should risk to the public be used solely as a means of
determining which defendants to incarcerate and which to place on probation?
Should it be confined to offsetting mitigating factors? If the defendant presents
a high risk of reoffending, should that be considered as a basis for increasing
the allowable maximum sentence? The answer is not immediately evident, but
it is clear that any valid analysis must attempt to resolve these fundamental
questions. Haphazard comparison or an appeal to an abstract concept of justice
will not suffice.
Once the fundamentals have been established, the law must attempt to fix
a scale within the statutory maximum. To do so, it is necessary to assign sen-
tencing ranges with reference to categories of commonly recurring factual pat-
terns and to categories of offenders. Although most would agree that judges
may draw upon their experience to discern the common categories, not all
would agree that the methods and language of the law should openly consider
and discuss such things as average lengths of sentences and the availability of
prison space. Is the common law method confined to dealing on a high level of
abstraction, or is it capable of openly grappling with the real issues? Stated
another way, are judges capable of pronouncing that a sentence shocks the con-
science but incapable of openly ruling upon the rational allocation of a scarce
and expensive resource-prison space?
It is not entirely surprising that a system that confers authority in direct
proportion to the degree of separation between the event and the proceedings
would tend to lean toward abstraction. Although reliance on a familiar abstrac-
tion may serve to legitimize a decision, it does little to ensure that the result is
sound. Moreover, abstractions sometime mask factual assumptions and obscure
the actual basis for decision, thereby frustrating any effort at responsible criti-
cism and stifling the possibility of development and improvement. Establishing
sentencing ranges for commonly recurring factual patterns is a task that lends
itself to a degree of empirical research and investigation. Although the common
law method is capable of receiving, evaluating, and reflecting empirical knowl-
edge, thus far the participants in sentencing appeals have chosen the comfort
and ease provided by reliance on abstraction. No one has even hazarded an
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attempt at providing an average length of sentence for a particular offense or
the census figures for jails and prisons. Although such statistical information is
not readily available, it does exist and could be used effectively despite obvious
shortcomings in the method of collection. If rationality or the appearance of
rationality is important to the law, and if reliance on judgment and experience
is to be obscured or minimized, it is essential that the law be informed by some-
thing beyond abstraction, anecdote, and analogy.
Even a cursory review of the sentencing appeals reveals that all of the par-
ticipants, lawyers, and judges rely almost exclusively on a familiar form of lin-
ear thinking and reasoning by analogy. Lawyers almost invariably conclude that
whatever took place in the past is correct and that the task of the advocate is to
demonstrate similarity or the absence of it. Judges respond to such advocacy
with the same type of reasoning. Although analogy is useful in making incre-
mental steps in advancing or retarding a developed doctrine, it is less useful
when formulating the doctrine. Here a broader frame of reference is required.
It is not enough that the sentence is similar to another; rather the question is
whether each sentence is based on a formulation that is workable and produces
desirable results.
Similarly, lawyers restrict both their inquiry and their advocacy to a nar-
row range of authority. It is difficult to believe that in the first four cases under
the newly enacted procedure for sentence appeal no one has cited the law review
article or any of the English material on which the statute was based. It is
equally difficult to believe that useful material could not be found in the
archives of social science and the academic community. For example, the philo-
sophical debate over the basis for punishment bears directly upon the determi-
nation of the proper relationship among the components of a sentence. In this
regard, lawyers display a rather complete lack of imagination. Because the com-
mon law court is dependent on advocacy and because judges are lawyers, the
work product of the court is cursed with the same affliction. On occasion, law-
yers and judges need to recharge their imagination by diverse life experience
and resort to literature. Imaginative writing is to the law what the experimental
laboratory is to science. Writers and poets draw upon sources unknown to the
law in imaging the conscious and unconscious experience of the individual and
society.
The law generally ignores the science of etymology and accepts language at
face value. It usually opts for a single, contemporary, and unchanging meaning.
Who knows what meaning lies buried in the Latin words extremus crudelis?
Even the simple image of the extreme or outermost edge of a field or forest
might assist in understanding the meaning of extreme cruelty. One need read
only a little theology or depth psychology to discover the rich levels of meaning
that other professions find embedded within words and images.
In an effort to appear rational, the language of the law is further restricted
by the practice of avoiding the use of words expressing ethical judgment, emo-
tion, feeling, intuition, or instinct. The law ignores what is otherwise openly
acknowledged: There are times when no single meaning of a word is sufficient.
Language occasionally breaks down completely and communication occurs only
through the use of symbols. At times only an image can connect experience with
[Vol. 52:611
1991] JUDGES ON JUDGING 623
the mind. The problems associated with sentencing require an expanded legal
vocabulary. Dogged reliance on Black's Law Dictionary and reasoning from
analogy will not suffice. It may prove necessary to rely on images and symbols
other than the black robe and the raised bench.
In writing this description of a modest experiment in lawmaking, I have
come to realize that, in the end, I reveal my own shortcomings as a judge. I
confess, I am resistant to change, and I do exhibit a decided preference for the
familiar. In my work I value the appearance of rationality, at times even to the
point of pretense. Although I realize that I rely on nonrational factors, I tend to
obscure that fact whenever possible. I sometimes attempt a detailed analysis
without first grasping the fundamentals. I am at my best and my worst when
dealing in abstractions. Finally, in attempting to make a common law of sen-
tencing I have learned that both my method and my language are severely lim-
ited, and I must continuously struggle to unite the outer and inner decision. It is
just possible that I may also have revealed similar defects in the art of lawmak-
ing as it is currently practiced.

